Cuenca del Pacífico
Retos y oportunidades para México

Es una colección integrada por cinco volúmenes, bajo la coordinación general de Melba E. Falck Reyes y editada por la Universidad de Guadalajara.

**Volumen 1.** Economía y cultura en la Cuenca del Pacífico, editado por Geneviève Marchini

**Volumen 2.** El modelo de desarrollo asiático. Relevancia para México, editado por Melba E. Falck Reyes y Roberto Hernández Hernández

**Volumen 3.** Jalisco y su inserción en la Cuenca del Pacífico, editado por Dagoberto Amparo y Melba E. Falck Reyes

**Volumen 4.** What’s in a name? Globalization, Regionalization and APEC, editado por Arturo Santa Cruz

**Volumen 5.** Agricultura en la Cuenca del Pacífico, editado por Roberto Hernández Hernández
Análisis

Toward a new Pax Sinica? Relations between China and Southeast Asia in the early 21st Century

Jörn Dosch*

Introduction: China’s leadership potential

Predicting China’s future position in the region has exercised an uncounted number of pundits. While some believe that China’s military potential is significantly overestimated, others see China as a military superpower in ten to twenty years time. Regardless of the likelihood or soundness of the latter scenario there can be little doubt about the fact that both the United States and most Southeast Asian governments are preparing themselves for a more assertive China. As Martin Stuart-Fox (2003) concludes his outline of some two millennia of contact between China and Southeast Asia,

The ASEAN ten will do all in their power not to provoke China. What they want is to both slow and ease the changing power balance. They want the United States to remain a powerful presence, serving as a balancing force in the regional power equation, and have made this known; but they do not want to be part

* Department of East Asian Studies and White Rose East Asia Centre, University of Leeds, UK. E-mail: j.dosch@leeds.ac.uk.
of any balance-of-power coalition. At the same time, they also want to make room for China (p. 240).

In other words, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has stayed true to its unwritten core principle of keeping its international options open and never leaning too heavily towards one big power. This strategy served ASEAN well during the Cold War and it seems to be working under the current structural circumstances, too. Most Southeast Asian states hedge against China primarily by accepting the need for a US role in the region. At the same time, the acceptance of Chinese leadership among the Southeast Asian governments is growing.

The PRC increasingly exerts regional leadership by setting the rules and organizing a growing network of bilateral and multi-lateral relationships in economic and security (both with regards to traditional and non-traditional security) fields. Just as in the cases of Pax Britannica and Pax Americana, the (re-)emerging Pax Sinica is characterized by the creation and enforcement of rules that favor the dominant state at the centre of the regional order. At the same time, the policies of China as a pre-eminent power on the horizon also bring economic, security and stability benefits to the states in its zone of influence. Thus, relations between China and Southeast Asia potentially take the form of a positive rather than a zero-sum game.

Robert Sutter links China’s rise to the potential emergence of “an ‘inside-out’ model of regional governance [which might be] displacing the past half century’s ‘outside-in’ model led by the United States through its regional allies” (Sutter, 2008: 93). While such a model has not emerged yet as China is still predominantly a one-dimensional power, based first and foremost on economic strength that cannot match the multidimensional power (hard and soft power) of the United States, the materialization of such a scenario is already looming large. In the current three-way competition among the US,
Japan and China for regional influence in Southeast Asia, China appears to be the most pro-active power.

China has already started to act like a traditional big power, proactively drawing up its own blueprints for regional order and pulling smaller neighbors along in its wake. “China is making big loans for big projects to countries that used to be the sole preserve of the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the United States and Japan” (Perles, 2006). The ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA), which was formally launched in 2002 and is projected to be fully implemented by 2010, is another example for China’s increasing leverage over the international relations of the Asia-Pacific. In May 2009 the PRC agreed to contribute US$ 38.4 billion (the same amount as Japan and significantly more than all other involved states: South Korea and the 10 ASEAN members) to a 120-billion-dollar emergency currency pool to boost liquidity and help the region overcome the current global financial crisis (Coates, 2009).

With the rapid growth of its economy, China has become increasingly involved in Southeast Asia’s traditional security affairs as well. Beijing has established military links with Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore, Burma/Myanmar, Cambodia, and Malaysia. This extends not only to military aid and loans, bilateral talks on military issues, joint production of military equipment, and joint training exercises; it also includes participation in regional security forums and the signing of defense memoranda of understanding (MOU). The view among Southeast Asian elites that ASEAN and China share the profits of security management in an overall situation of a positive-sum game (or win-win situation according to the official Chinese term)\(^1\) has been growing, particularly since the beginning of the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao era in 2002-03. The foreign policy of the so-called ‘fourth generation’ leadership (after those led by Mao, Deng, and Jiang) has put strong emphasis on the fostering of friendly and mutually beneficial relations with neighbouring states (Xiao, 2009: 306).

Leadership in international relations can only emerge and be institutionalized if the dominant regional power is willing to assume the responsibilities associated with it, is capable (in material terms of both hard and soft power) of establishing primacy, and is acceptable as a regional leader in the eyes of the subordinated states. In the following, I will try to provide empirical evi-

---

1. “China will pursue a ‘mutually beneficial win win’ strategy in its opening up to the outside world in the next five years...” CPC/Beijing (China.org.cn, 18 October 2005).
dence that, while several conflicts and disputes (mainly with regard to border and territorial issues) remain unresolved in China-Southeast Asia relations, the PRC’s scores increasingly well in all three categories of leadership. I will begin with a brief elaboration on Chinese approaches to regional conflict management using the example of the South China Sea. This will be followed by a discussion of Beijing’s attempts to increase energy security for itself by strengthening bilateral and multilateral relations with its Southeast Asian neighbors in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS). In the third steps, I will delve into a so far under-researched development: China’s emergence as an international donor in the region. Some reflections on, first, the question as to whether ASEAN-centered regional cooperation in the region mediates a potentially emerging Pax Sinica, second, and the level of regional acceptance of Chinese pre-eminence and the limitations to it conclude the paper.

The article deliberately avoids the term hegemony to characterize China’s rise in Southeast Asia. The Chinese translation of hegemony as *ba dao* has a noxious moral connotation as “unjust domination.” It is in this context that Zhou Enlai once said “we will never be hegemons,” a statement later echoed by Deng Xiaoping and many other Chinese leaders, for example Li Peng who confirmed in 2001: “China is opposed to hegemonism and will never seek hegemony itself”. This part of the Maoist legacy seems to be unchanging. While the linguistic problem could be countered to some extent by stressing that the term hegemony has no normative connotation if based purely on Western International Relations terminology, any discourse on Chinese hegemony would inevitably provoke an analogy with US hegemony.

It is important to note that while the paper is written mainly from a neo-realist perspective, the potential fallacies of this approach are not ignored. Neo-realism’s problem is its “insistence on the sameness effect and on the unchanging, structurally determined nature of international politics” as Paul Schroeder (1994: 148) has reminded us in his stimulating critique of neo-realist thought. The following analysis does not pretend to paint the full picture of China’s emerging position in Southeast Asia. The central question is not as to whether China is able and willing to assume the role that the US
Toward a new Pax Sinica? Relations between China and Southeast Asia in the early 21st Century

has played in the Asia Pacific over the past decades. Likewise, the following discussion does not primarily focus on China’s relative power vis-à-vis Japan or other powers in the region but considers structures and processes that have contributed to the strengthening of the PRC’s position in Southeast Asia in absolute terms. It goes without saying that variables not discussed in the following, such as multilateral institution-building or regional identity-formation, might shed a different light on any suggestions of an emerging Pax Sinica. However, it can be useful – and it is certainly legitimate – from an analytical point of view to take just one perspective in the complex puzzle of Southeast Asia’s international relations as it sharpens our eyes for developments that otherwise might get lost in theoretical eclecticism.

Joining the Chinese Bandwagon for Economic and Security Benefits: The Spratly Islands Dispute

Until recently, China, with the exception of the Mongol Yuan Dynasty and a short period in the early Ming Dynasty, was a land-oriented empire and not a maritime power. During most of Chinese history, the most dangerous threat came from nomadic powers in Inner Asia, which diverted Chinese strategic attention toward the northern and western frontiers. In addition, as agriculture provided the basis of Chinese economy in the pre-modern times, China did not need to develop a powerful navy or conquer maritime territories to secure its access to resources. All this has changed with the programs of modernization following the defeat of Qing China at the hands of maritime powers. The largest threat now came from the southeastern coasts and a modernizing China’s growth and stability would depend in large part on its connection with the world market and overseas resources, primarily through the East and South China Seas.

It was in this context that in the early 20th century Chinese authorities began to assert Chinese sovereignty over the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. This triggered protest by the Vietnamese court at Hue, which had established its control over the islands well before the French conquests of Vietnam. In the 1930s, while China began to publish maps declaring its territorial claims in the South China Sea, French authorities in Indochina also began to set up weather stations on and send garrisons to the Paracel and the Spratly Islands (Chemillier-Gendreau, 2000; Nguyen Nha, 1975; Li/Li, 2003).
The PRC and successive governments controlling South Vietnam, including the Hanoi regime since 1975, inherited this dispute from Nationalist China and French Indochina. Today, as China’s participation in world trade and its demand for overseas energy and raw materials are both large and increasing, the South China Sea becomes more important for China.

At the heart of territorial disputes in the South China Sea lay the Spratly islands - a collection of mostly barren coral reefs, atolls, and sand bars, many of which disappear at high tide, covering an area of some 70,000 square miles. This area is claimed, in whole or in part, by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines. The other major area of dispute in the South China Sea concerns the Paracels, which are claimed by China and Vietnam. With the exception of Brunei, all of the disputants maintain a military presence on some of the islands. Since 1978, when the Philippines set out its Exclusive Economic Zone formally including the island Kalayaan claimed by Manila, the parties in the dispute have held generally consistent claims. However, the controversy itself lay relatively dormant until 1988 when China and Vietnam clashed over Fiery Cross Reef. Since then hostilities in the South China Sea have regularly erupted, most prominently between China and the Philippines. The Philippines considers China’s occupation of Mischief Reef in 1995 and repeated Chinese incursions into Scarborough Reef since 1997 as direct assaults on the Philippines’ territory (Odgaard, 2004: 16).

Although a resolution of the disputes is not in sight, the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea of 1992 (signed by China in 2002) is often praised as a first step toward a peaceful settlement. Though nonbinding and from a formal institutional point of view not even a code of conduct, politicians and many scholarly observers alike hope that the agreement will nevertheless oblige the Southeast Asian claimants and China to avoid any activity that would damage or complicate their relations. In a very optimistic liberal-institutionalist scenario the declaration constructively contributes to the avoidance of armed clashes among the parties over their conflicting claims on the sovereignty of the Spratly Islands (Cheng, 2004: 259) and the “declaration’s confidence-building measures have appeared to appease claimants” (Thai Press Reports, 17 March 2009).

One has to remain skeptical, however, that ASEAN’s multilateral approach based on consensus building and voluntary, nonbinding commitment to the principle of non-use of force will provide a sustained institutional framework for security management, particularly since the Declaration on the South China
Toward a new Pax Sinica? Relations between China and Southeast Asia in the early 21st Century

Sea lacks any specific provisions on how to resolve the conflict. Samuel Sharpe (2003) finding that ASEAN has not been able to establish sufficient leverage in seeking a wider code of conduct with China is still valid. The more effective strategy of maintaining peace in the South China Sea is based on bilateral and multilateral negotiations initiated and facilitated by the PRC. Most importantly, Vietnam signed a land border treaty with China in 1999, and another treaty on the demarcation of the Gulf of Tonkin in 2000 that came into effect in June 2004 after more than three years of negotiations on how to implement the agreement (the demarcation itself was still ongoing in mid-2009). These treaties have narrowed down the scope of territorial disputes at least between these two countries relating to the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos.

In September 2004, the Philippines jumped on the Chinese bandwagon with the signing of an agreement for joint marine seismic exploration in the South China Sea for possible undersea oil. Vietnam joined the agreement in March 2005, when the Vietnam Petroleum Corporation (PetroVietnam), the Philippines National Oil Company (PNOC), and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) finalized a tripartite agreement in Manila to jointly exploit oil and gas resources in the South China Sea. Philippines Foreign Minister Alberto Romulo and Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Dy Nien praised the deal as a significant measure to strengthen ASEAN-China cooperation and possibly pave the way for settlement of the South China Sea dispute. Beyond the political rhetoric, the agreement does not reflect core ASEAN values and norms but rather mirrors a new strategic setting in which the Southeast Asian claimants compete for the most favorable bilateral or multilateral agreements with China as the driving force behind the creation of regional order. This perception corresponds with the views of a Chinese government official who was involved in the negotiations.

When we signed the agreement with the Philippines in 2004 it meant that Vietnam had fallen behind. And although Vietnam joined the agreement later, we are still more advanced in our negotiations with the Philippines. We are also speaking to Malaysia but these talks are less developed than those with the Philippines and Vietnam. A very important achievement in our relations with Vietnam is our joint maneuvers with the Vietnamese navy in the Beibu [Tonkin] Gulf.3

In late April 2006 the Chinese navy began its first-ever patrols with a foreign ally, sending ships to patrol with Vietnamese warships in the Gulf of Tonkin. According to the Chinese Ministry of National Defense, the joint patrols were intended to strengthen joint cooperation and maintain security of fishing fleets and oil exploration. The PRC is strengthening its naval power – driven at least partly by the concern that any disruption to energy shipments through the major sea lanes of communication would act as a brake on the nation’s economic (in 2003, China surpassed Japan as a consumer of petroleum, moving into second place behind the United States): “China is pursuing sea power – measured by the Mahanian indices of commerce, bases, and ships – and it is building up a powerful navy with dispatch” (Holmes and Yoshihara, 2008: 367; see also 369).

Furthermore, in the wake of an apparent pirate attack on a Chinese fishing vessel in the Spratlys also in 2006 that left four crewmen dead and three wounded, China, the Philippines, and Vietnam announced plans to strengthen security cooperation in the Spratlys to address piracy, smuggling, and transnational crimes. So far, the emphasis of the Vietnamese and Philippines governments on bilateral and trilateral diplomacy in the South China Sea, particularly in relations with China, has not been in open contradiction with collective ASEAN approaches. Yet, this diplomacy takes place outside the ASEAN framework and is a visible indication of a bandwagoning approach towards the PRC. Hanoi’s and Manila’s foreign-policy efforts might even place the countries in the South China Sea dispute in a more favorable position vis-à-vis China than some of their fellow ASEAN members, especially Malaysia. Despite occasional sabre-rattling – such as a brief diplomatic row between Beijing and Manila in the first half of 2009 over the sovereignty of the Spratlys – provocative acts between China and the Philippines and Vietnam respectively in the South China Sea have declined in the past decade.

Positive Sum Games in the Management of Resources?

As in the case of the Spratly Islands, the management of security in the Mekong valley first and foremost follows China’s blueprint for order maintenance based on its national interest, particularly as far as access to resources is concerned. An increasingly important aspect of China’s interests toward Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar is the enhancement of the former’s energy security. This is particularly visible within the context of the Greater
Mekong Subregion (GMS). The GMS is a core element of Beijing’s policy outlook. The PRC has been represented geographically in GMS by Yunnan Province since 1992. In December 2004, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region was formally included in the GMS.

The Mekong River is the world’s twelfth-largest river and Southeast Asia’s longest waterway. It originates in Tibet and flows through the Chinese province of Yunnan before continuing southwards, touching the territories of six countries (China, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam) and ending in the South China Sea. The GMS covers some 2.3 million square kilometers and contains a population of about 245 million. The post-World War II history of cooperation within the Mekong valley dates back to 1957 when the Mekong Committee was established at the initiative of the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) and four riparian countries of the lower Mekong Basin (Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and South Vietnam). For more than three decades, however, the implementation of subregional integration was halted by the prevalence of cold-war structures, or more accurately hot wars and armed conflict, in the region. The process only gained momentum in 1992 when, with the assistance of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the six riparian states of the Mekong River (Cambodia, China, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam) entered into a program of formalized subregional cooperation.

The GMS program has been directed to the management of non-traditional security arenas such as the facilitation of sustainable economic growth and improvement of the standard of living in general and the management of environmental and energy security in particular. The sustainable utilization of water and natural resources in the Mekong basin is directly and inevitably linked to human survival in the region. Energy security is mainly related to the promising but not uncontroversial issue of hydroelectric power. Compared with rivers of a similar size like the Nile and the Mississippi, the Mekong is still

---

4. As of 31 December 2006, ADB had extended loans totalling almost $1.92 billion for 28 loan and grant projects with a total project cost of $6.8 billion. These projects are in transportation (18 projects), energy (4), health (3), and tourism (3). GMS governments and development partners have provided about $2.2 billion and $2.7 billion, respectively, for these 28 projects. The ADB claims that between 1990 and 2003, the proportion of people living in the GMS on less than $1 a day fell from 46% to 33.8% in Cambodia, 33% to 13.4% in the PRC, 52.7% to 28.8% in Laos, 10.1% to less than 1% in Thailand, and 50.7% to 9.7% in Vietnam (ADB, Greater Mekong Subregion, Development Effectiveness Brief, Draft 18 July 2007).
relatively untouched. The first Mekong bridge (between Thailand and Laos) was only opened in 1994 and the first mainstream dam, the 1,500 megawatt Manwan, was only completed in 1995 in Yunnan. Since then the development of hydropower has been among the main priorities of the GMS project and resulted in the two Laos-based Theun Hinboun Hydropower Project, which started commercial operation in March 1998, and the Nam Leuk Hydropower Development that was completed in May 2000.

With international conflicts over river water becoming more frequent, there is concern that the Mekong could become a serious source of tension unless the six states can agree on rules for developing the river. The most valuable achievement to reduce the potential for conflict is a technical cooperation agreement achieved in 2002 between China and the Mekong River Commission (MRC, founded in 1995), grouping Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. The agreement commits China to sending 24-hourly water level and 12-hourly rainfall data to the MRC to help forecast floods. The design of an early flood warning strategy ranks very high on the agenda of both policy makers and international donor organizations. While China has duly provided the required information since the agreement’s implementation in 2003, other key data—most decisively on water quality and pollution—are kept strictly confidential. Various attempts by the lower Mekong states, particularly Vietnam, to get access have failed.5

On issues that would impact on national decision-making authority, such as dam building in the Chinese stretch of the Mekong, China steadfastly refuses to share information. The uncoordinated construction of power plants and irrigation systems by the upper Mekong countries, particularly China, which plans to build more than a dozen power plants (although on the Mekong’s tributaries and not the main stream), poses a serious challenge to subregional stability. The construction could result in a potentially explosive competition between the upper and the lower Mekong states for water resources. Politicians and senior officials from the lower Mekong states, mainly Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia, have regularly expressed concerns about China’s proposed dam-building activities, albeit more indirectly and in private than openly and in official intergovernmental meetings. Some perceive China’s ambitious hydropower plans as a zero-sum game in which the PRC’s economic gains would be paid for by the lower Mekong states’ environmental

5. Author interviews conducted in the GMS states between June 2006 and September 2008.
costs, such as rising salinity levels in Vietnam’s agriculturally indispensable Mekong Delta.

Official Chinese interests in the Mekong region can roughly be divided into two realms of importance: domestic and foreign policy. The domestic interest consists of the development of China’s landlocked western provinces and the promotion of border trade with the adjoining countries of Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam. A further domestic strategy aims at narrowing the gap between the ethnic Chinese Han population and ethnic minorities. Furthermore, the government envisions that an economically emerging west will reduce internal migration from western China to the booming coastal cities. In a more general strategic sense, Beijing seeks to put its relations with Southeast Asia on an amicable basis in order to counterbalance US influence in the region (Dosch/Hensengerth, 2005). The PRC is able to play a preeminent role in the Mekong valley, partly because it imposes its will on the lesser states in terms of setting the stage for, but also the limits to, cooperation, and partly because the other members benefit from China’s cooperation and thus accept China’s leadership.

Energy security offers a good example of the emergence of reciprocally beneficial linkages between China and the states in its zone of influence. Since September 2006, China has been supplying electricity to Vietnam through a cross-border 220-kilovolt power transmission line to ease Vietnam’s chronic power shortage problems. Further transmission lines are under construction or being planned. China (through the state-owned company, China Southern Power Grid) is also involved in the building of electricity generation facilities in Vietnam, Laos, and Myanmar, enabling the Southeast Asian GMS members to deliver electricity to China’s western provinces when it will be much needed in only a few years’ time to further fuel rapid industrialization. The electric power trade between Yunnan and Vietnam has reached some US$ 100 million in 2007 (Anonymous, 2007: 1).

In February 2009, the Chinese Guangdong Nuclear Power Group announced its interest to help Vietnam build its first nuclear power plant, comprising two 1,000-MW reactors to be located in the southern coastal province of Ninh Thuan (Grieder, 2009). The trend toward ever-closer ties between China and Vietnam, which is not necessarily directly facilitated but at least underpinned by the two countries’ shared political ideology, also serves the wider interests of both communist parties vis-à-vis the United States. Despite strengthening US-Vietnam economic and diplomatic ties, Vietnam is keen to
avoid aligning itself too closely with the US, while China is equally eager to counter the US’s growing influence in Vietnam.

Relations between China and Myanmar are another case in point for the growing benefits of cooperation on energy security. China is playing a key role in the construction of large dams on rivers in Myanmar, such as the Salween River. There are at least 14 Chinese companies involved in approximately 40 hydropower projects in Myanmar (Earth Rights International, 2007). Chinese investors have become increasingly dominant in the energy, mining and to some extent manufacturing sectors in Myanmar (Kudo, 2006; Business Week, 24 December 2001). The rapid growth of China’s economy has resulted in an increasing demand for energy resources, particularly oil and gas. Although the country itself is rich in energy resources on an absolute basis, China is poorly endowed on a per capita basis.

The widening gap between China’s oil supply and demand and the projected gap between natural gas supply and demand mean the country will increasingly become reliant on imported oil and gas. The government encourages the biggest Chinese state-owned oil companies, including Sinopec, CNOOC, and CNPC, to find and develop new fields at home and abroad and has heavily invested in the construction of pipelines and the exploration of oil and gas fields, including in Myanmar. This meets the interest of the Burmese military junta that needs external support from to facilitate the exploitation and development of the country’s energy resources. The cooperation with China offers potential areas to foreign investors while maintaining a tight control over the extraction, distribution and sale of its resources.

Some observers claim that significant output of petroleum for example is not expected until after 2010 (Energy Information Administration 2007). Nevertheless, it is obvious that the Chinese government believes in the profitability of investments in Myanmar’s energy sector. After all, Myanmar’s energy reserves are said to be abundant, with proven recoverable reserves of 510 billion cubic meters out of a total 2.54 trillion cubic meters estimated reserves of offshore and onshore gas. In addition, its recoverable crude oil reserve is estimated to have 3.2 billion barrels (Maung Aung Myoe 2007: 15).

---

7. China National Offshore Oil Corporation
China has at least 17 onshore and offshore oil and gas projects in Myanmar. Key investors are Sinopec, CNPC and CNOOC, which signed MoUs with MOGE for the exploration and the sale of natural gas (Earth Rights International, 2007: 3).

China’s involvement in Myanmar provokes questions beyond energy security: has the PRC’s eminent role in Myanmar’s economy and – at least indirectly – the fact that this role has provided a lifeline to the Burmese generals been strengthened or even facilitated by the European and American pull out from the country? And in a more general sense with potentially far-reaching implications: does China’s ‘no strings attached’ approach to international cooperation challenges core principal of Western and Japanese ODA in Southeast Asia?

China’s emergence as an international donor: Challenging the ‘West’ and Japan?

In 2007, the total official development assistance (ODA) from members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) fell by 8.4% in real terms to US$ 103.7 billion. The combined ODA of the fifteen members of the DAC that are EU members – which represents 60% of all DAC ODA – declined by 5.8% in real terms to US$ 62.1 billion. Among the most decisive developments has been the downward trend in Japan’s ODA. Japan tumbled to fifth place among the world’s 22 major aid donors in 2007, its lowest ranking since 1972. The country’s net ODA was US$ 7.7 billion, representing 0.17% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and a 30.1% fall in real terms year-on-year. The four largest donors in 2007, by volume, were the United States, followed by Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. The only countries to exceed the United Nations target of 0.7% of GDP were Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.9

The global decline in DAC ODA payments in general and Japan’s contributions in particular were in part due to a decrease in debt relief operations, which had been exceptionally high in 2005 and 2006. Although figures for total ODA worldwide – DAC and non-DAC – do not exist, empirical evidence suggests that development assistance of so-called emerging donor countries, such as China, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, South Africa and

South Korea, has been significantly growing while the boundaries between donor and recipient countries have become increasingly fuzzy. This is particularly the case in Asia where most of the ‘new donors’ are located with China being the most important one. Partly due to the successful development of China’s economy, the Japanese government informed Beijing that it wanted to end its ODA yen loan program to China by 2008 (Drifte, 2008).

At the same time, the development aid strategies and policies of OECD donors have markedly changed in recent years. In addition to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)\(^{10}\) the promotion of democracy, good governance, respect for human rights and for the rule of law occupy centre-stage on the development agenda. However, the governance focus of the EU and the US is in stark contrast to Japan’s (still) predominantly mercantilist approach to ODA and China’s “no strings attached” ODA policy based primarily on national resource interests. The possible clash between OECD and Chinese concepts of development assistance towards the African continent has recently been the growing focus of academic and practical-political discourses. Yet, East and Southeast Asia have received relatively little attention, even though the seeming contradictions between European, Chinese and Japanese ODA policies and the potential long-term implications of increasing competition among donors are nowhere more obvious than in Asia. Especially China’s rapid transformation from an ODA recipient to a main donor in Asia has not been researched yet.

Over decades until the recent past Japan had been successfully implementing regional foreign and foreign economic policies through the generous provision of economic and financial and above all ODA. Japan’s keizai gaiko (economic diplomacy) was the country’s most efficient and effective foreign policy tool contributing to peace and stability in the region and creating the environment and pre-conditions for stable relations between Japan and its neighboring countries in East and Southeast Asia.

Japan’s rapid economic growth in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s enabled Tokyo to dedicate significant financial resources to the economic development of East and Southeast Asia while at the same time consolidating and expanding its political and economic influence and position in the region. To be sure, as a country highly dependent on the import of raw materials (due

\(^{10}\) The MDGs, among other objectives, aim at the eradication of poverty, achieving universal primary education and promoting gender equality.
to the lack of natural resources in Japan), establishing stable and mutually beneficial relations with countries rich of natural resources in Asia (and beyond) was a necessity for Japan and its own economic development. At the heart of Japan’s foreign economic policy was the country’s strategy to use its wealth and economic capabilities to help creating a politically stable neighborhood beneficial to its own economic and political position and standing in the region.

From the early 1980s onwards, Japan greatly increased its contributions to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. In addition to its multilateral efforts, Japan raised its share of ODA giving amongst members of the DAC from 12% in 1980 to about 20% in 1998. In 1998 Japan’s ODA per capita was roughly three times that of the United States. For many years, Japanese aid has concentrated in the region of Asia. Indeed, Asian countries received an average of 60 per cent of total Japanese ODA during the 1980s and 1990s, an amount greater than any other region (Tuman/Strand, 2000).

China in particular but also South Korea and a number of developing countries in Southeast Asia profited immensely from Japan’s support and promotion of regional economies. Recently, however, Japan has begun to decrease its ODA payments in East and Southeast Asia and further cuts are likely in the coming years in view of Japan’s rising public debt and fiscal problems. On the one hand, the Japanese government has been facing pressure from within Japan to curtail its spending on ODA. On the other hand, the international community (particularly the developing nations) expects Japan to continue to provide a high level of development assistance. The Japanese government is therefore being exposed to competing pressures from the domestic and international communities, and under these conditions it will likely find its continued active promotion of ODA much more difficult than originally anticipated (Kusano, 2000: 39).

The reduction of Japan’s ODA payments to Southeast Asian countries suggests that Tokyo is prepared to let China fill the vacuum left by the cutback of Japanese ODA and other forms of economic and financial support. Despite being still a developing country itself (by official classifications), China has in recent years developed pro-active and visible foreign economic policies which in some ways resemble the Japanese version of the same policies in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s.

A Japanese 2006 ODA White Paper claimed that contributions by China, India and other emerging donor nations had “become significant enough
for developing countries to influence them... It is quite difficult to grasp the whole picture of aid activities by such countries. They should make their activities more transparent and follow international rules.”11 Indeed, China has been accused of:

- unethical and string-free support for ‘rogue’ or ‘pariah’ states;
- providing unconditional aid and opaque loans that are said to undermine European and multilateral efforts to persuade governments to increase their transparency, public accountability and financial management (governance agenda);
- ‘free-riding’ Western debt relief efforts and undermining individual country’s external debt sustainability and disregarding the multilateral framework for debt sustainability;
- intensifying global economic and strategic competition to secure energy supplies;
- using its China’s self-interested strategies in dealing with developing countries, trying to assert influence and using its soft power in order to support its own development without any coordination with Western countries, often even aggressively confronting them;
- neglecting environmental and social standards (Berger/Wissenbach, 2007: 3).

In the Philippines, the Chinese government has spent US$ 1.8 billion on development projects and will provide US$ 6 to 10 billion in loans over the next three to five years to finance infrastructure projects in country.12 China’s growing support for the Philippines comes at a time when EU is considering terminating its development assistance for the country given the lack of progress in key development areas. In the case of Cambodia, Southeast Asia’s most aid-dependent country where China has emerged as the largest foreign donor, Beijing provided at least US$ 800 million in 2005 and 2006 with a focus on infrastructure and hydropower projects.

The influence of other donors has inevitably declined. OECD donors are worried about their swindling leverage over key reform areas such as tackling corruption and strengthening good governance in Cambodia. “China has

11. Quoted from The Daily Yomiuri, Tokyo, November 20 2006.
offered aid unconditionally, a policy line that has created tensions among parts of the donor community” (Mills, 2007). In a similar vein, the PRC has increased its presence in Laos and established itself particularly in sectors, such as agriculture, forestry and infrastructure development, where other donors have reduced their role. Some donors perceive Laos as needing support to avoid being simply taken over by China. However, as Lao government officials point out, it is difficult to differentiate between Beijing’s ODA and FDI as most of the funds are channelled through Chinese state companies.13

According to the EU’s Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) of 2006, European development cooperation with Asia is, *inter alia*, intended to consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, good governance, gender equality and related instruments of international law.14 These priorities seem to be at odds with China’s presumed self-interest driven motivations to extend ODA to the region. If the PRC’s attempts at regional leadership already extend even to the highly normative domain of development cooperation, it is hard to imagine that growing Chinese preeminence would go unchallenged.

**Mediating the emerging Pax Sinica? The role of ASEAN, multilateral cooperation and regional integration**

“Everyone wants ASEAN to be in the driver’s seat of regional co-operation because ASEAN’s leadership is more acceptable in the region than China’s or Japan’s”. This remark by Valérie Niquet, the Director of the Asia Centre at the French Institute of International Relations in Paris15 reflects the general perception that the key-role in the search for, and maintenance of, multilateral arrangements in the region has been played by ASEAN ever since the organization took the initiative to apply its well-established model for regional security on a wider Asia-Pacific basis in the early 1990s.

ASEAN was founded in 1967 and is often referred to as the most successful regional cooperation scheme outside Europe. The ASEAN dialogue mechanism, a set of various forms of official and informal consultation, coordination and

15. Author interview in Jeju, South Korea, October 2007.
networking at different levels of decision-making worked effectively enough to produce peaceful conflict management. Perhaps the most valuable achievement of the ASEAN security model is that it has successfully managed to keep residual conflicts between the members (especially territorial disputes) from leading to armed confrontation. Recent developments suggest that the peace dividend of the so-called ASEAN Way of regional cooperation might be successfully extended to relations between Southeast Asia and China.

At least at first glance, empirical evidence seems to suggest that ASEAN has been successfully engaging China, thereby significantly contributing to order-building, security and stability in the Asia-Pacific. When the process of ASEAN identity formation seemingly expanded into the wider East Asian or Asia-Pacific region, academic analysis followed suit: The focus is now on East Asian community building and the assumed effects are similar to the observed empirical reality within Southeast Asia. The more the idea of community takes hold in East Asia, the more stable and secure the region will become, so the argument goes. China’s integration in such a community is seen as key to the emergence of a peaceful international order, and ASEAN has regularly received credit for its leadership abilities and presumed success in engaging China in a growing network of regional consultative fora such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Plus Three Meeting (APT), and the East Asian Summit (EAS).

However, as the example of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) shows, it was primarily China that engaged ASEAN, not the other way round. Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji first proposed a trade agreement at the ASEAN+China meeting in November 2000 in response to the Asian economic crisis and regional concerns about the impact of China’s then-imminent WTO membership. Under the Framework Agreement on ASEAN-China Comprehensive Economic Co-Operation, which was officially announced and signed in November 2002, ASEAN and China envision the liberalization of 99 percent of their bilateral trade in stages: by 2010 for the ASEAN-6 and China; and 2015 for Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam (Fukagawa, 2005).

Yet this proposal “also arose out of an acute sensitivity toward the need to maintain relations with as many states as possible in order to constrain American power under a global system defined by the struggle between ‘one superpower, many great powers’” (Hughes, 2005: 127). Since China’s admission into the WTO, the proposed FTA has further contributed to the enhancement of Beijing’s position as a pre-eminent regional power, not only
in relation to the United States but also at the expense of Japan. Tokyo reacted with alarm to the plan and subsequently entered into talks on a Japan-ASEAN FTA within the framework of the so-called Japan-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Partnership. Within ASEAN China is perceived as an engine of growth, a distinction that previously belonged to Japan. ACFTA, accompanied by the offer of an early harvest, has strengthened China’s status as a benevolent regional leader.

Strategic, security, and political objectives are essential elements of Beijing’s economic outreach. For example, according to one of the PRC’s most senior economists, Ma Hong, “the pattern of setting up a free-trade region is a favorable direction for China to develop the relationship of regional grouping and regional alliance” (cited in Keith, 2004: 514, emphasis added). China’s proposal of a “strategic partnership” with ASEAN that was made at the ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting in Phnom Penh in June 2003 has to be seen in the same context. Multilateralism in ASEAN-China relations has developed to a degree where Beijing is setting the regional agenda (Hughes, 2005: 120). A European senior diplomat confirms this for meetings between the EU and China. “China is very pro-active on political issues and increasingly open to agendas that used to be taboo only a short while ago, including regionalism, monetary integration, and even democracy and civil society. Beijing is constantly testing new ideas. Anything goes as long as Taiwan, Tibet and Falun Gong are not mentioned.”

The first East Asian Summit in Kuala Lumpur in December 2005 is another point in case. The meeting was attended by the ten ASEAN members, China, Japan, South Korea, India, New Zealand, and Australia. Japan’s suggestion that Washington at least be invited as an observer made no headway mainly as the result of Beijing’s effort to exclude the United States. Behind ASEAN’s closed doors, Indonesia and Vietnam were especially critical of Washington’s exclusion but did not want to challenge Beijing. According to Abdul Razak Baginda, “there is now this feeling that we have to consult the Chinese. We have to accept some degree of Chinese leadership, particularly in light of the lack of leadership elsewhere” (quoted in Cody, 2005). China has both an interest and the capabilities (in terms of hard power and, most important, soft power as the example of ACFTA demonstrates) to provide regional leadership.

17. Abdul Razak Baginda is the executive director of the Malaysian Strategic Research Center.
However, this does not mean that China always gets its way. For example, prior to the first East Asian Summit China’s offer to host the second meeting was rejected by ASEAN (Yamakage, 2005: 3). China was equally unsuccessful in lobbying the Vietnamese government for the exclusion of Taiwan from the APEC Summit in November 2006 in Hanoi and the right of sitting next to the host at the summit meetings (the seating was instead arranged in alphabetical order as at previous APEC summits).  

**Conclusion and Outlook: Southeast Asia’s Growing Acceptance of Chinese Regional Leadership – and the Limits to it**

If community building and identity formation take place in the Asia Pacific in general and in Sino-Southeast Asia relations in particular, they are not the prime driving forces behind growing regional stability but rather mask, or perhaps ease, the effects of China’s increasing international preeminence. From a neorealist perspective, it can be argued that relative order and peace in the formerly war-prone region have not derived from ASEAN’s leadership in engaging China but are mainly due to the rising concentration of Chinese power in Southeast Asia. When one state possesses considerably more economic, military, and political power resources than the other states in a system of states, it can use that power to coerce the other states or provide them with selective incentives in order to induce cooperation. In this manner, the dominant state increases the costs of defection and decreases the risks of cooperation, thereby making peace and stability possible (Ripsman, 2005).

On the one hand, the PRC’s foreign policy since the early 1990s is characterized by a “gradual acceptance of a multilateral approach towards Southeast Asia” (Hughes, 2005) and “a more vigorous approach to multilateralism at both the international and regional level” (Keith, 2004). On the other hand, there can be little doubt that Beijing is challenging ASEAN’s trademark role as the architect of multilateral cooperation in the post-cold war Asia-Pacific and, partly as the result of ASEAN’s weaknesses and partly due to China’s quest for preeminence, has more and more assumed the position of first among equals in the existing multilateral frameworks. While China’s active integration in multilateral activities has seemingly improved Sino-ASEAN relations, rela-

---

tive stability and peace between the two sides are not primarily the result of institution building and community formation, an eastward extension of the ASEAN way of diplomacy, or an emerging liberal peace deriving from tighter networks of economic cooperation.

As the South China Sea disputes, cooperation in the GMS and the PRC’s rapidly growing role as a donor demonstrate China is increasingly assuming a regional leadership role that sets the rules because this role is perceived as being favorable to the enhancement of the PRC’s national interest. Furthermore, and equally important, Beijing’s leading role as a manager of regional order is acceptable to key players in Southeast Asia as they see their own benefits as the result of cooperation with China. While China does not promote its system of governance abroad – in the way that OEDC donors tie development aid to good governance or the US has followed the credo of manifest destiny in the transfer of political norms and values – the Deng and post-Deng reform process provides an attractive model in some parts of Southeast Asia and particularly to Vietnam and possibly also Laos (Dosch/Vuving, 2008).

While the Spratly Islands disputes remain unresolved and concerns over China’s use of the Mekong’s resources have not been entirely eliminated, as explained, the perception among Southeast Asian elites that ASEAN and China share the profits of regional order management in an overall situation of a positive-sum game has been growing. China has integrated ASEAN into a regional order that, while not hostile to multilateralism, mainly reflects hard strategic thinking on Beijing’s part and is primarily based on rules established by the PRC. Unthinkable only a decade ago, the acceptance of regional Chinese leadership in the management of security has grown. ASEAN diplomats have begun turning to Chinese colleagues for guidance during international meetings. Only a short while ago Chinese diplomats were viewed as outsiders by their Southeast Asian counterparts.¹⁹

As the PRC’s growing preeminence in the management of regional order is accepted and even perceived as beneficial for the region by key governmental elites in Southeast Asia, the international relationship between China and ASEAN will increasingly generate stability. Due to the reciprocal nature of this system, which generates benefits for both the dominant and the lesser

¹⁹. This assessment is based on author interviews with senior government officials conducted in Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Laos and at the ASEAN Secretariat in 2008 and 2009.
actors, and in the absence of clear systemic alternatives, “no state believes it profitable to attempt to change the system,” as Robert Gilpin (1981: 10) put it in general terms. China-Southeast Asia relations might not have reached a state of complete equilibrium as a result, but they are more stable than they have ever been before.

Is this too simplistic a view? Do Beijing’s growing security and economic links with Southeast Asia and proactive role in multilateral fore indeed attest to China ever increasing regional influence and leadership? Or are we easily blinded by a highly successful mix of Chinese ‘win-win’ rhetoric and China hype? Certainly, it should not be ignored that there are limitations to the Southeast Asian embrace of Chinese preeminence. For example, a sense of resentment toward China, emanating from historical legacies, persists within much of Vietnam’s political elite, as remained the case with a proportion of the wider Vietnamese population. A low point in diplomatic relations was reached in December 2007 when thousands of Vietnamese took to the streets of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City to protest against what they viewed as China’s incursions into Vietnamese territory in the South China Sea (the first rally in half a century in communist Vietnam) (Vuving, 2008).

Anti-China protests resurfaced in December 2008 but were quickly overwhelmed by the Vietnamese government forces. This is where the United States re-enters the scene. No two sets of bilateral relationships are more important to Vietnam than its relations with China and the United States. Maintaining the best possible balance in its relations with the two powers has emerged as the cornerstone of Vietnam’s foreign relations in the post Cold War era. All Southeast East Asian governments (with Myanmar being the only notable exception) hedge against China by sustaining their links with the US because “Washington is seen as the ‘least distrusted power’ in Southeast Asia with no territorial or other ambitions directly at odds with ASEAN states’ interests” (Goh/Simon, 2008: 7).

In the 1990s Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia signed military access arrangements with the United States, followed in 1999 by the implementation of the US-Philippines Visiting Forces Agreement. These arrangements form part of a broader set of military cooperation and training activities in Washington’s relations with Southeast Asian states that follow a new approach of a “places not bases” policy in the region. In 2003 the US granted Philippines and Thailand “major non-NATO ally” status, which entitles the two governments to special access to US intelligence, among other privileges.
In 2005 Singapore and the US signed a Strategic Framework Agreement for closer partnership in defence and security cooperation based on the explicit premise that “a strong United States military presence is vital for regional peace and stability” (Strategic Framework Agreement, Art. 1a).

Beyond long-term strategic considerations, both the US and ASEAN states consider an American military presence as a decisive – probably the most important – contribution to securing the commercial routes in the region. United States military power in the Asia-Pacific is based on the presence and mission of the Seventh Fleet, the largest of the Navy’s forward-deployed fleets, including 40-50 ships, 200 aircraft and about 20,000 Navy and Marine Corps personnel. As for American soft power in Southeast Asia, US exports to ASEAN are currently more than twice as large as US exports to China. Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia are among the top twenty-five trading partners of the United States. Furthermore, the United States is by far the largest overall investor in Southeast Asia, followed by Japan and the United Kingdom. Washington has signed trade and investment framework agreements (TIFA) with Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam and is negotiating FTAs with Thailand and Malaysia.

Preliminary free trade talks have been conducted with the Philippines and Vietnam. While “the United States has used FTAs as political rewards for countries that support US foreign and security policies” (Pang, 2007: 2), the strategy works because it is a two-way street. American and Southeast Asian views on the mutually reinforcing links between economic and security gains overlap. Recent developments suggest that the United States will not drastically change its strategic approaches towards Southeast Asia. Absent irrational leadership or a catastrophic attack, the most likely mid-term scenario for the US role in the region is a continuation of bilateral patterns in economic and security relations characterised by economic partnerships and free trade agreements on the one hand and defence arrangements on the other with a growing number of Southeast Asian states.

Furthermore, opposition to the US international role has been relatively low-key in Southeast Asia in recent years, even during the Iraq war. Yet, if any single actor was to challenge the well-established American position as a primus inter pares among the external powers in Southeast Asia, China is the most likely candidate. For the time being and to the extent that their limited autonomy toward regional order building allows, the Southeast Asian governments – individually and collectively through ASEAN - keep their inter-
national options open and pursue a double hedging strategy which is aimed at taking maximum advantage of both Beijing’s and Washington’s strong involvement in the region while trying to prevent the (re-)emergence of any type of hegemony, be it American or Chinese.

References


Nguyen Nha (1975) ‘Thу dat lai van de Hoang Sa’ [Reconsidering the Paracel Islands Issue], *Su Dia [History and Geography]*, No. 29.


